Building a Centralized State, Reinforcing Ethnic Fragmentation
Written by: Mohammad Naser Sidiqee – Development Policy Expert
For the last 16 years, the United States approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan has made certain that all hopes are securely attached only to them while ignoring the inter-ethnic rift and antagonism that has engulfed the country since its establishment.
Since mid-nineteenth century significant material assistance, grants, subsidies and military aid by foreigners as well as attempts by Afghan rulers to unify the country and build a strong Afghan nation has failed in the face of ethnic rifts and internal political conflicts.
The death of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1773 marked the beginning of a decline in Afghan state’s reputation and influence in the face of rising destructive intertribal and interethnic clashes. These succession squabbles among mostly Pashtun tribes and battles for autonomy between the dominating Pashtuns and non-Pashtun ethnic groups resulted not only in the loss of resource-rich territories but also the flight of merchants and artisans.
It wasn’t until Dost Mohammad Khan’s declaration of Jihad (holy war) against the Sikhs in 1835 that the central government enjoyed popular support from all segments of the society. However, this unification was short-lived and soon became irrelevant in the face of excessive centralization and structuring of the government institutions along the tribal and ethnic loyalties.
Although Abdul Rahman Khan imposed and succeeded in achieving a high degree of centralization, his policies and practices toward the various people of Afghanistan, especially non-Pashtuns, would plague the twentieth-century Afghanistan. His relations with the British and harsh punishment of dissent enabled him to build a relatively powerful and self-sufficient regular army and use it as his coercive arm to suppress Pashtun tribal rivalries as well as other types of opposition. However, his internal policy of favoring Pashtuns over non-Pashtuns and among Pashtuns relying on his own clan widened the socio-cultural split between the inhabitants of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan entered the 21st century with same shattered society and ethnic rift. The composition of the subsequent regimes since the overthrow of King Amanullah in 1929 has remarkably circled around the same ethnic parameters as that of former Afghan rulers. A major characteristic of it is the overrepresentation of Pashtuns in the centers of power.
When Amanullah abdicated from the throne in January 1929, within a few days Habibullah Kalakani, a Tajik declared himself Amir-ul-Mumineen (Commander of the Faithful). That for the first time in history a non-Pashtun had ascended to this position of prominence sent shock waves through the political establishment and chill down the spine of Pashtun tribes. Only because Habibullah Kalakani was a non-Pashtun, eastern and western Pashtun tribes as well as their clergymen reconsidered their opposition to Amanullah and joined forces to restore the very King whom they had overthrown a few months earlier after declaring him an infidel. The Pashtun tribes chose to overlook their internal feuds and more importantly, Amanullah’s so called un-Islamic reform agenda to deal with someone they believed was an outsider. Ethnic nationalism had so deeply and effectively penetrated the Afghan social structure that even Islam as a universal religion in the country could not bring political cohesion.
Upon ascent to the throne, Nadir Shan too reinforced these ethnic divisions by giving his family and kinsmen powerful government posts. He appointed Hashem Khan his brother the Premier, Shah Wali Khan the Minister of War and Shah Mahmud as the Minister of Interior. The 1973 coup by Nadir Shah’s nephew Daud did, however, end the monarchy, but not the Pashtun dominance.
In 1965 the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was established and by 1967 it has split into two factions of Khalq (the Masses) and Parcham (the Flag). The Khalq under the leadership of Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin enjoyed popular support among the Soviet-trained military cadets while the Parcham led by Babrak Karmal heavily recruited among bureaucrats. In 1978 the PDPA deposed and killed Daud in a bloody coup, and the more radical Khalqis, who was in favor of bringing down the regime and quickly progressing to socialism, became dominant in the government.
Although in 1978 coup, the Durrani dynasty was finally displaced. But Pashtuns, this time Ghalzais, would continue to dominate the political arena until 2001. Most of the political and military figures during this period on all sides, whether as PDPA rulers (Taraki, Amin, and Najib), leaders of Islamic movements (Hekmatyar, Abdul Haq, Haqqani) or Taliban (Mullah Omar) were Pashtuns. Needless to say, that when in 1993 Dr. Najib’s government fell, the Mujahideen factions elected Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, as the president. Yet again his authority and legitimacy were widely challenged by most of the Pashtuns who refused to recognize his government which resulted in the devastating civil war.
Although the Taliban mobilized under the banner of Islam, or so they claimed, they disregarded its unifying commandments and refused to recognize the diverse characteristic of Afghan society. They repeatedly declined proposals by President Rabbani and his military commander Ahmad Shah Masoud to find a negotiated settlement to the war and accommodate all ethnic groups in a unified government.
It is in the light of such historical background that the current government should backtrack from its policy of excessive centralization and consolidation of state power which has affected mostly the non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Otherwise, opposition to the centralized government will continue to grow and attempts to build a strong and unified nation-state will meet with failure should the current government continue to articulate its policies along the ethnic and tribal parameters.
